It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations
I. Introduction
In recent years, the question of jurisdictional conflicts between international courts has attracted much scholarly attention.
1 This article will focus on the the ECJ and the court or tribunal, which is given jurisdiction by the agreement, may claim jurisdiction over a dispute between Member States of the Community.
This shows that there is a potential for conflicts of jurisdiction between the ECJ and international courts, which can result in contradicting decisions over the same case. Such a scenario would be highly problematic in terms of legal certainty but also for the reliability of international and Community law in general.
In this context, the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction is particularly interesting as from the point of view of European Community law it excludes the other court's jurisdiction.
While the conditions for the ECJ's jurisdiction over such agreements have been widely discussed, this article will ask and attempt to answer two further questions:
First, whether there are exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction. And second, whether another international court or tribunal called upon to decide such a dispute would be forced to dismiss the case.
II. The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the ECJ

The General Scheme Laid Down in the Treaty
Articles 220 to 245 of the EC Treaty contain the main provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ).
Article 292 EC indicates that this jurisdiction is exclusive. The provision provides that 'Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein'. 5 Accordingly, any Member State, which submits a dispute regarding Community law to another court but the Community courts, violates the Treaty. The ECJ discussed the exclusivity of its jurisdiction for the first time in Opinion 1/91. In that opinion, the ECJ found the draft agreement on the European Economic Area to be incompatible with the EC Treaty because it provided for a Court to be established that was supposed to decide upon disputes between the 'contracting parties' to that agreement. Apart from ensuring a consistent interpretation of Community law, the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ entails that the procedural particularities before the ECJ cannot be dispensed with. These particularities include the requirement of the 6 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 34; this was confirmed by the Court in Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493, para 15-17. 7 Such disputes can be brought before the Court according to Article 227 EC, which happens very rarely.
European Commission giving a reasoned opinion in proceedings according to
Article 227 EC and the requirement for an opinion of the Advocate General.
In terms of content, Article 292 EC endows the ECJ not only with an exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the EC Treaty itself but also over secondary Community law, such as the interpretation of directives or regulations. When it comes to potential jurisdictional conflicts between the ECJ and another court or tribunal, the Community's agreements are of special interest as they will sometimes provide for their own dispute settlement mechanisms.
According to the ECJ's consistent case-law since Haegeman, 8 
provisions in
Community agreements can become an integral part of Community law. Where that is the case, the ECJ will claim that it is exclusively competent to interpret these agreements. 9 This means that in case of a dispute over the interpretation of such an agreement, Member States will have to ignore the means of dispute settlement provided for in that agreement and bring the dispute before the ECJ instead.
Different Types of Agreement
Regarding agreements concluded by the Community alone, this case-law does not cause much difficulty. All provisions of these agreements must be regarded Article 123, 192, 193, 194, 206, 207, 211 and 213 UNCLOS. 17 A mixed oxide (which is a type of nulcear fuel) plant. choice of whether they want to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or to arbitration.
Where the parties cannot agree on a procedure for the settlement of their dispute, that dispute can only be submitted to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS.
18 As Ireland and the United Kingdom could not agree on a procedure for the settlement of their dispute, the case had to be submitted to an Annex VII arbitral tribunal. Ireland also applied for a preliminary ruling, for which the ITLOS was competent as the arbitral tribunal had not yet been set up. 19 The ITLOS assumed its own jurisdiction on the basis that it considered the Annex VII arbitral tribunal to have prima facie jurisdiction over the case according to Article 290 (5) UNCLOS. 20 The question of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction was problematic as in its pleadings before the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, Ireland referred to several provisions of Community law. In addition, the UNCLOS is a mixed Community agreement, over which the ECJ has potential jurisdiction. which cannot be attained without first interpreting the EC Treaty itself. Admittedly, a declaration on the distribution of competences is not a treaty but a unilateral act.
The rule contained in Article 31 (3) (c) VCLT can, however, be applied mutatis mutandis.
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In the Mox Plant-Case, the declaration made under Annex IX of the UNCLOS even went so far as to explicitly invite its interpreters to refer to Community law stating that 'the Community has exclusive competence only to the extent that such provisions of the Convention or legal instruments adopted in implementation thereof affect common rules established by the Community'.
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The question of when common rules are affected can only be resolved by interpreting the Community rules referred to. Therefore, in such a case Member States asking another court or tribunal to interpret that declaration implicitly ask it to interpret Community law. This would clearly constitute an infringement of Article 292 EC.
Preliminary Conclusion
It follows from the foregoing that from the ECJ's point of view, its exclusive jurisdiction is all-encompassing and guarantees that the ECJ has the final say in the matter. This of course restricts the Member States in their choice of forum.
Should the interpretation of a Community agreement be relevant for the resolution of a dispute between two Member States, they are thus forced to proceed in two stages. First, they will have to submit the dispute to the ECJ under Article 227 EC. The ECJ will then have to decide whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case, i.e. whether the provisions relevant for the case are This is one of the reasons why Oen, n 13 at 145, argues that the ECJ should not enjoy jurisdiction in such cases. Otherwise Member States could be deterred from resolving the dispute in the first place. Article 292 EC was potentially triggered. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal entered into a lengthy discussion why Article 292 EC was not applicable in the present case. The Tribunal argued that it was in a position analogous to that of a domestic court within the EC and thus the exceptions to the duty to make a preliminary reference according to Article 234 (3) EC were applicable. 41 Therefore, the Tribunal had to discuss whether it could decide the case without interpreting rules of EC law, which neither constituted actes claires nor actes éclairés.
42 After a lengthy discussion, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that EC law was not necessary for its decision. Therefore it viewed itself as competent to decide the dispute.
This line of argument, however, is not persuasive. The crucial question is,
whether an arbitral tribunal formed under public international law is really in a position analogous to that of a domestic court when it comes to the interpretation of EC law. In order to make an argument of analogy, two requirements must be fulfilled: firstly, there has to be a lacuna in the law and, secondly, there must be a relevant similarity between the original rule and the case at hand.
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Addressing the first question, whether it constitutes a lacuna in the EC Treaty that the rules for the relationship between national courts and the ECJ are not the same as those for the relationship between international courts and the ECJ, there a good reasons to doubt that the tribunal reached the correct conclusion. In addition, it is also doubtful whether the second condition for the existence of an analogy, the existence of a relevant similarity between the two rules at hand, is fulfilled. There is a marked difference between domestic courts and international courts when it comes to the interpretation of Community law. In principle, domestic courts have a right to interpret Community law whereas Article 292 EC bans international courts from interpreting it. The right of domestic courts to interpret Community law is reflected in Article 234 (2) EC, which gives them a right to make preliminary reference to the ECJ but does not 44 Langenbucher n. 43 at 483.
oblige them to do so. A duty to make such a reference lies only with courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy. This means that domestic courts, which are not courts of last instance, may generally interpret any provision of Community law. In the wider sense, they are thus part of the Community legal system. In contrast to that, international courts and tribunals stand outside the Community legal system. Their relationship with Community law is thus similar to that of a privately established arbitral tribunal, which has also been formed outside the Community legal order. Such a private arbitral tribunal has no right to make a preliminary reference according to the ECJ. 46 It is thus not in a position analogous to that of a domestic court even though it decides over domestic disputes. Therefore a fortiori, an arbitral tribunal formed under international law to decide an international dispute cannot be in an analogous position either. Moreover, as Lavranos has correctly pointed out, the Tribunal failed to understand the consequence of the CILFIT-jurisprudence.
Other than the Tribunal suggests, the consequence is merely that a domestic court is released from its obligation to make a reference but not from actually applying Community law.
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The Iron Rhine Tribunal, however, chose to completely disregard Community law.
In conclusion, an international court or tribunal facing the interpretation of Community law is not in a position similar to that of a domestic court. An analogy The reservations typically exclude 'any dispute which the Parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement or which is subject to another method of peaceful settlement chosen by all the Parties' (quote from the German declaration of 1 May 2008). Only Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Sweden do not seem to have included a reservation to that effect. However, when doing so, Member States would have to bear in mind whether such exclusion makes sense for them as the judgment or award they receive will not reflect the true legal situation between them. If the Member States then act according to that decision rendered by the international court or tribunal, they may even act contrary to Community law and thus can be held responsible under Articles 226 and 228 EC.
IV. Duty of Other Courts to Respect the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the ECJ
Having examined the exact scope of the ECJ's jurisdiction and explored the possibility of exceptions to it, a further issue arises: Are international courts and tribunals bound to respect the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction or is that merely a matter of Community law, which is of no relevance from the point of view of public international law? Generally speaking, the jurisdiction of international courts only reaches as far as the instrument granting them jurisdiction permits.
For instance, the ITLOS only has jurisdiction over the UNCLOS 54 and could thus maintain that Article 292 EC is of no relevance for it even though it is a mixed agreement under Community law. The same holds true for any dispute brought ad hoc to the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal, which will normally only consider the declaration under Article 36 (2) or the arbitration agreement in order to determine its own jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the PCIJ argued in an obiter dictum in the Rights of Minorities Case that it would not have jurisdiction where the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of some other authority.
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The PCIJ, however, did not give any reasons for this dictum. The article will therefore explore several routes which could lead to a duty for international courts to accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ.
A. Prohibition to Interfere with Other Courts
In German academic writing of recent years it has been argued that there exists an emerging doctrine in international law, which prohibits an international 54
Cf. Article 279 UNCLOS, which expressly refers to disputes over 'this Convention'. organization to interfere with the effectiveness of other international organizations (Störverbot). 56 According to that view, when interpreting a provision pertaining to the legal order of another organization the dispute settlement body of one organization has a duty to respect the interpretations of the dispute settlement body of the organization to which that provision pertains. It is argued that there is even a duty to ask that dispute settlement body for an opinion on the interpretation of its provisions. 57 In that sense, the prohibition to interfere with another organization is said to be similar to the prohibition on the use of force laid down in Article 2 (1) Cf. exchange of letters between the Council of Europe and the European Community concerning the consolidation and intensification of cooperation (OJ 1987 L 279 p. 35). 67 This was argued by Ruffert n 56 at 162.
an abuse of rights. The prohibition to abuse one's rights can be regarded a general principle of international law. 68 The doctrine prohibits the malicious exercise of a right in order to attain an advantage while at the same time the other party is put at a disadvantage. 69 Considering that the act of bringing a dispute before a court is the exercise of a right usually arising from a treaty, the concept of abuse of rights is generally applicable in this respect and can be referred to as abuse of process. Clear cases of such an abuse are the instigation of proceedings in order to harass or harm the defendant or where the claim made is manifestly groundless. 70 There is, however, a crucial difference between proceedings before international courts and proceedings before domestic courts, for which the doctrine of abuse of process has first been developed. Proceedings before a domestic court can (and will) normally be instigated against the will of the defendant. The defendant must answer the case in order to avoid a default judgment and is thus 'forced' into the proceedings. In Nonetheless, it would have to be established that the plaintiff acted maliciously.
Therefore, the abuse of rights doctrine is only of limited value for the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts as a court will only be able to dismiss its jurisdiction on that basis where the defendant has not agreed to the proceedings and where the plaintiff has acted maliciously.
C. Article 292 EC As Lex Specialis
Yet another possibility would be to view Article 292 EC as lex specialis to other provisions providing for the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal but the ECJ.
The lex specialis principle is widely recognized as a general principle of international law and applicable for the solution of treaty conflicts. 73 The principle says that the more specific rule prevails over the general rule. Conflicts of jurisdiction between international courts and tribunals are treaty conflicts because that jurisdiction depends on the consent of States, which is usually given by way of a treaty. International courts and tribunals only have jurisdiction if they are granted such jurisdiction in an international agreement. Therefore, where there are two or more international courts or tribunals which potentially have jurisdiction over a dispute, this jurisdictional conflict is at the same time a treaty conflict. 74 The rationale behind the application of lex specialis as a rule for resolving treaty conflicts is that it reflects more closely the consent of the states in question. 75 Therefore, Lowe is right in arguing that the principle of lex specialis
can also be applied in cases of jurisdictional conflicts as it is a reflection of the parties' will.
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The application of lex specialis is thus consistent with the requirement of consent as the basis for jurisdiction. This result is confirmed by Articles 27 and 46 VCLT. These articles ban a party to a treaty from invoking provisions of domestic law for the justification of the violation of that treaty. Otherwise treaty-making would be highly insecure as third parties could never fully rely on the validity of treaties.
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Community law shares many similarities with domestic law. It is (partly) directly applicable in the internal legal orders of the Member States and enjoys primacy over domestic law. In addition, the division of competences between Member
States and the Community is rather complex and cannot easily be understood by an outsider so that a third State would deserve to be protected. Therefore, the idea behind Article 27 and 46 VCLT can be applied to Community law. Therefore, the plaintiff Member State does not deserve to be protected by the law.
In addition to that, the other court or tribunal is unable to render a decision that is truly binding on the Member States involved as such a decision must not be followed under Community law. For this reason, that court or tribunal should be forced to decline to hear the case. 89 In the Mox Plant-Case, the arbitral tribunal seems to have gone down a similar route in that it suspended proceedings until a decision about the ECJ's jurisdiction had been made. 90 However, the legal basis for the arbitral tribunal's suspension remained unclear. It seems to be mainly based on 'mutual respect and comity' rather than on the explicit exception laid 89 down in Article 282 UNCLOS or even the solution argued for in this paper.
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Nonetheless, that decision shows that international courts and tribunals are aware of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and its implications for the Member States.
V. Conclusions
The article has tried to demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the ECJ is far-reaching and covers all areas of Community law, effectively banning other international courts and tribunals from interpreting it. Considering that according to the ECJ's case-law, international agreements are an integral part of Community law there is ample potential for jurisdictional conflicts between the ECJ and other courts, which have also been granted jurisdiction over the treaty in question. When it comes to mixed agreements, the ECJ has jurisdiction over all provisions for which there was an exclusive or shared Community competence. Only would not bind any other court subsequently interpreting the same provisions, the dangers for legal certainty are rather low.
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In addition, disputes between Member States will hardly ever be isolated from core Community law such as the EC Treaty or secondary legislation, over which the ECJ would undoubtedly have exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore the ECJ's rigorous approach is justified.
Regards the UNCLOS this is an already built-in feature: Article 287 UNCLOS provides for various possible fora for the decision of disputes over the interpretation of the UNCLOS.
